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1 Introduction
It is now widely accepted that well functioning ﬁnancial systems can help promote economic
growth, especially in middle income countries (Rioja and Valev 2004, Demetriades and Andri-
anova 2004). However, the policies that could advance ﬁnancial development remain elusive
for many developing countries. Importantly, ﬁnancial liberalization, widely considered critical
in delivering a more eﬃcient and competitive banking system, has frequently been followed by
ﬁnancial instability, especially where institutions such as rule-of-law and regulation were weak
(Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache 1999, Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999, Arestis and Demetriades
1999). Surprisingly, even though ﬁnancial liberalization policies have been widely adopted, gov-
ernment ownership of banks remains prevalent in many countries (Barth, Caprio and Levine 2000).
Could this stylized fact to some extent explain why ﬁnancial development has not taken oﬀ in
some countries, or, indeed why ﬁnancial liberalization has been followed by ﬁnancial instability?
An important recent paper by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) suggests that this
may indeed be the case. The authors report a number of cross-country correlations which suggest
that the degree of government ownership in the banking system is negatively related to subsequent
ﬁnancial development and economic growth, and positively associated with ﬁnancial instability. If
these relationships are causal, as indeed is implied by the authors, then large-scale privatizations
of banking systems around the world could generate enormous beneﬁts in terms of both ﬁnancial
development and economic growth.1 However, if the relationships observed in the cross-country
data reﬂect reverse causality or are driven by other factors, then it is essential to know what
factors determine the presence of government owned banks and what the likely implications of
their privatization might be.
A careful analysis of government ownership of banks needs to explain why state banks exist in
the ﬁrst place. Is it purely driven by political motives, as postulated by the “political view” of state
banking, or is it a response to institutional deﬁciency?2 Stylized facts, as well as empirical studies,
1The estimated eﬀects in La Porta et al. (2002) are quite large: a 10 percentage points rise in the share of
government ownership of banks reduces the growth rate by approximately 0.25% per annum.
2Stiglitz (2002), pp. 54–59 and 157–160, provides a vivid illustration of the risks associated with premature
privatization in both developing and transition economies. See also Perotti (2001), who discusses the Russian
experience.
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provide credence to both possibilities. For example, the evidence from Russia suggests that
mistrust of banks by the general public means that most savings are not in the ﬁnancial system
and that 70% of retail bank deposits are controlled by Sberbank, the largest state savings bank.3
Additionally, the bi-variate cross country regressions reported in La Porta et al. (2002), suggest
that government ownership of banks is negatively correlated with property rights protection and
other institutional quality indicators, as well as with political rights or democracy.4
In order to advance our understanding of the determinants of the share of state (government
owned) banks in the banking system, this paper oﬀers a theoretical analysis of depositors’ behav-
ior, when they have a choice between private and state banks. We postulate a plausible trade-oﬀ
between the two types of bank, the nature of which is aﬀected by institutional quality. Speciﬁ-
cally, while private banks are assumed to be more eﬃcient than the government owned bank, some
private banks are assumed to be opportunistic. Under weak institutional quality, the presence
of opportunistic banks may create a preference for the less eﬃcient but safer state bank among
some depositors. The institutions which matter for this trade-oﬀ are those that could contain
opportunistic behavior by banks (speciﬁcally, prudential regulation and supervision, contract en-
forcement, and more broadly, the rule of law); these kinds of institutions can play a fundamental
role in protecting depositors’ property rights. Another institution that could, in principle, protect
depositors is deposit insurance. However, explicit deposit insurance is absent in many ﬁnancially
underdeveloped economies. Even where it exists, it is less than perfect. A recent World Bank
survey of banking practices around the world (Barth, Caprio and Levine 2001) reveals that 32
out of the 83 countries studied in the empirical section of this paper did not have an explicit
deposit insurance law. The uninsured sample includes some highly developed ﬁnancial systems
such as New Zealand, Australia and Singapore but mostly underdeveloped ﬁnancial systems such
as Rwanda, Russia, Gambia, Ghana, Burundi and Moldova. Of the 51 countries that had explicit
deposit insurance six did not fully compensate depositors the last time a bank failed, 4 did not
report whether they compensated depositors and 8 reported no bank failures. In most of the
remaining 33 countries depositors in failed banks had to wait for long periods of time to get reim-
3CSI (Coalition of Service Industries) Background Paper on Russian Banking Services (22 May 2002).
4It should be noted, however, that the bi-variate nature of the regressions reported in Table III in La Porta et al.
(2002) makes it impossible to establish which determinants of government ownership of banks are the statistically
signiﬁcant ones.
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bursed, sometimes more than a year. Our modeling of depositor compensation as both imperfect
and uncertain concurs well with these facts.
Our argument is developed in a locational model of banking that allows us to examine both
banks’ and depositors’ behavior. A novel feature of our model is that it contains two types of
private banks: honest and opportunistic.5 The former type always honor their contracts with
depositors (due to, perhaps, high reputational costs), while the latter choose whether to do so
depending on the probability of deposit contract enforcement. To this set-up we also add a state
bank that is assumed to be less eﬃcient than private banks. Depositors are unable to distinguish
between honest and opportunistic (private) banks, but know the probability of encountering
each type and also know the probability of deposit compensation, should they end up with an
opportunistic bank that breaches its deposit contracts. This set-up results in three diﬀerent types
of equilibria. A “low” equilibrium occurs when institutional quality is low, the proportion of
opportunists is high, and no private bank would choose to enter. A “high” equilibrium occurs
when institutional quality is suﬃciently high and all private banks honor their deposit contracts.
In the absence of subsidies to the government owned bank, this translates into all depositors
placing their funds with private banks. And, ﬁnally, an “intermediate equilibrium”, in which
private banks and the state bank co-exist. We show that in the latter region the demand for
state deposit contracts is greater when the enforcement probability is lower or the proportion
of opportunistic banks is greater. We also show that when institutional quality is poor, non-
existence of the state bank leads to ﬁnancial disintermediation. The model is enriched further
by introducing an enforcement externality which may arise from ﬁxed resources devoted to the
enforcement of deposit contracts. This extension leads to multiple equilibria for a certain range
of parameter values. The equilibrium is then determined by perceived institutional quality: even
when institutional quality is relatively high, the economy may end up in the low or intermediate
equilibrium if depositors believe that opportunistic banks would breach their deposit contracts.
5Gerschenkron (1962) provides the example of Russia in the 19the century where “...the standards of honesty
in business were so disastrously low that no bank could have hoped to attract even such small capital funds as
were available ...” (p. 19). Modern day examples of opportunistic behavior in private banking include the recent
experience of transition economies with wildcat private banks. The Financial Times (6 June, 22 and 23 December
of 1995, and 30 January 1996) documents a number of such episodes in the Baltic States. There are also examples
from developed economies, which almost invariably reﬂect failures of prudential regulation, such as the case of
BCCI, and the example of pension misselling in the UK, including the recent one of Equitable Life.
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In a further extension of the model, we show that the introduction of government subsidies
for the state bank, which may reﬂect political considerations, can lead to a shrinking of the
high equilibrium region. This is because subsidized state banks have an unfair advantage over
private banks, in that they can oﬀer more competitive deposit rates than private banks to some
depositors, thus creating a positive demand for state deposit contracts even when institutional
quality is high. In the medium range of institutional quality, this encourages opportunistic banks
to breach their deposit contracts.
We test our theoretical predictions using cross-country data by regressing the share of assets
in state controlled banks obtained from Barth et al. (2001) on a number of variables that are
suggested by the theory. Speciﬁcally, we utilize a number of institutional quality indicators,
including prudential regulation, rule of law and disclosure requirements. Additionally, we utilize
a number of proxies to capture the possible inﬂuence of politically motivated subsidies, including
a political orientation dummy, the share of government consumption in GDP and a variable that
captures the presence of an IMF program. To check for robustness of our results to more general
speciﬁcations, we repeat all the regressions by adding legal origin variables. These variables may
reﬂect wider political or historical determinants of the share of state banks and, as such, are
not captured by our theoretical model. We also carry out additional robustness checks using
alternative dependent variables, which reﬂect diﬀerent deﬁnitions of government ownership of
banks. These checks bolster the empirical case further. They also provide additional insights into
the extent of government ownership required for state banks to be perceived as good substitutes
for weak institutions.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model and its predictions.
Section 3 presents the data and empirical ﬁndings. Section 4 concludes by discussing some policy
implications.
2 Theory
2.1 Model
Our starting point is the “circular city” model of product diﬀerentiation: by locating at a partic-
ular point in the product space, the bank chooses to oﬀer a speciﬁc bundle of banking services,
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while otherwise identical depositors diﬀer in their preferences over a mix of banking services.6
The bank chooses a speciﬁc bundle, rather than a continuum of bundles for all possible prefer-
ences, because the ﬁxed costs of developing and researching all possible bundles are too large.
The discrepancy between the bundle oﬀered by the bank and that preferred by a given depositor
is captured by the “distance” between the depositor and the bank, which leads to the depositor’s
utility loss (captured by a “transportation” cost) from not consuming his/her preferred bundle.
This model is extended to incorporate a state bank together with the possibility of opportunistic
behavior by private banks.7
Speciﬁcally, a single state bank and n private banks compete for deposit contracts. The money
collected from private depositors can be invested into a riskless technology with a constant rate
of return r. The depositors are endowed with 1 unit of cash but do not have direct access to
this technology: they have to transact (by striking a deposit contract) with a bank to earn a
return on their cash holdings. There is a continuum of risk-neutral depositors who are uniformly
distributed along a circle. Distribution density and the length of the circle are both unitary. A
depositor incurs a positive transportation cost α which is proportional to the distance between
the depositor and the bank.8
The state bank is located in the center of the circle, reﬂecting the transition or development
context that we have in mind. That is to say, it is assumed to have been in existence for some
time, and, as a result, has a branch network and/or product range that appeals equally to all
depositors.9 It therefore oﬀers a net deposit rate of rs = r0s − α/(2π) > 0 to all depositors.
Private banks are located anywhere along the circle with bank i oﬀering deposit rate ri (i =
6The “circular city” was originally developed by Salop (1979) to model monopolistic competition between ﬁrms.
It was subsequently applied to banking (Freixas and Rochet 1997) as an analytically convenient way to model
deposit contracts competition among banks which diﬀer only in their ﬁxed setup cost. We choose this model as our
starting point because it allows us (i) to focus on savings mobilization—as opposed to the loan-making—function
of banking, and (ii) to introduce into the model two new aspects: bank ownership and asymmetric information.
7Implicitly, each private bank has only one branch. It can be shown that allowing for multiple branches would
not change the results, provided that the branches are not adjacent. See Freixas and Rochet (1997).
8The linear cost is not important; any convex cost function would lead to the same results (Tirole 1988, Freixas
and Rochet 1997).
9This implies, in particular, a zero ﬁxed cost of the state bank.
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Figure 1: Structure of the banking industry
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1, . . . , n). There are potentially many identical private banks that can enter the industry at a
positive ﬁxed cost, F . In this setup, therefore, each operating private bank competes with its
two immediate neighbors, while the state bank is, in principle, able to compete with all private
banks. The return from the state deposit contract is assumed to be certain: the state bank honors
its deposit contracts without fail. This may be because the accountability of the public sector
by means of various bureaucratic controls prevents the state bank from taking advantage of its
depositors, albeit at the cost of lower eﬃciency compared to a private bank (see (A2) and further
discussion below). The assumption that the state bank is honest refers only to how state banks
deal with depositors. It does not rule out the possibility that the government imposes an inﬂation
tax or that lending oﬃcers of the state bank are corrupt.
An operating private bank could be of either opportunistic type with probability γ (with 0 <
γ < 1), or of honest type with probability 1− γ. The type of a bank is private information, while
the value of γ is common knowledge.10 An honest bank never fails to honor its deposit contract:
at the end of the deposit contract it pays out the deposit rate speciﬁed in the contract, together
with the initial deposit of 1 unit of cash. The distinction between “honest” and “opportunistic”
banks captures dynamic reputational considerations which are not explicitly modeled in our static
framework. A non-myopic, or “honest”, bank’s concern for the future forces it to honor all its
10For example, γ may reﬂect the ease of entry into the banking industry.
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deposit contracts in expectation of continued custom by its existing depositors. In contrast, a
myopic, or “opportunistic”, bank has no concern for the future and may choose to seize any short-
term gainful opportunity even if it hurts its existing depositors. The gainful opportunity in the
model is the breach of the deposit contract: the bank takes the money and runs, and therefore
the depositor loses not just the promise of ri but also his initial deposit of 1 unit of cash.11
An opportunistic bank’s choice between honoring and breaching its deposit contracts depends,
however, on the quality of enforcement institutions. The latter are assumed to be such that a
cheated depositor expects to get a payment of deposit compensation, d > 0, from the oﬀending
bank with probability λ (with 0 < λ ≤ 1).
The timing of the game is as follows.
(1) Private banks decide whether to enter; n banks enter.
(2) Private bank i (i = 1, . . . , n) sets its deposit rate ri.
(3) Each depositor chooses the bank in which to place the deposit of 1 monetary unit.
(4) Opportunistic banks choose whether to honor or breach their deposit contracts.
(5) If a contractual breach has occurred, the aﬀected depositors seek compensation.
(6) Payoﬀs are realized.
Given the sequential nature of the game, the appropriate solution method is backward induc-
tion. Firstly, for a given strategy of opportunistic banks (namely, breach of or compliance with
the deposit contract), depositors choose which bank to entrust with their deposit. Secondly, given
the level of demand for its deposit contracts, each bank sets the deposit rate at the level which
maximizes its proﬁts. Finally, for a given level of demand and proﬁt maximizing deposit rate,
each private bank decides whether to enter. The benchmark case is analyzed in section 2.2 and
then extended to include an enforcement externality in section 2.3 and a subsidy to the state bank
in section 2.4. All proofs are contained in Appendix A.
11This assumption is based on bank “looting” strategies such as those explored in Akerlof, Romer, Hall and
Mankiw (1993, pp. 1–73)
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2.2 Benchmark case
Let q ∈ {0, 1} represent an opportunistic bank’s decision to honor its deposit contracts where the
value of q (q = 1 honor, or q = 0 breach) is set by the bank to maximize its proﬁts. As a shortcut,
call q the probability of compliance (or, 1 − q the probability of breach). Consider the expected
payoﬀs of the players (depositors and private banks). By going to a private bank i, a depositor
located at distance xi expects to obtain:
Upbi (q) = [1− γ(1− q)] · (1 + ri) + γ(1− q) · λd− αxi, (1)
where αxi is the transportation (or transaction) cost. If the bank does not cheat (with probability
[1−γ(1−q)]) the depositor gets the contractual rate ri, in addition to the initial holding of 1 unit
of cash. Otherwise (with probability γ(1− q)), the depositor loses his 1 unit of cash but expects
the deposit compensation of d with probability λ.
Any private bank at the end of the deposit contract has in its possession 1 + r per depositor.
An honest bank honors all of its deposit contracts by paying out 1 + ri, and therefore retains as
(per depositor) proﬁt the diﬀerence between the rate r determined by the investment technology
and the rate ri it oﬀers. An opportunistic bank, in contrast, pays out 1 + ri only if it honors
its contract (with probability q), and additionally expects to lose λd per depositor if it cheats
(with probability 1− q). Because the deposit contract oﬀered by a given bank is the same for all
depositors, the opportunistic bank that decides to breach one of its deposit contracts will cheat
all of its depositors. Denoting by Di the demand for bank i (i = 1, . . . , n), the expected proﬁt of
an honest and opportunistic private bank, respectively, is therefore calculated as follows:
V 1−γ = (r − ri) ·Di, (2)
V γ(q, λ, d) = [(1 + r)− q(1 + ri)− (1− q)λd] ·Di. (3)
The expected payoﬀs from a deposit contract with a state bank are
U sb = 1 + rs (4)
to any depositor, because every depositor is one radius away from the state bank (with rs =
r0s − α/(2π)), and V s = (r − r0s) · Ds to the state bank. To simplify the exposition further, the
analysis of the model utilizes the following:
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Assumption 1 d = 1 + r (A1)
Under (A1),12 the expected payoﬀs (1) and (3) above simplify to the following:
Upbi (q) = [1− γ(1− q)] · (1 + ri) + γ(1− q) · λ(1 + r)− αxi, (5)
V γ(ri, q, λ) = [q(r− ri) + (1− q)(1 + r)(1− λ)] ·Di. (6)
Assumption 2 rs ≤ r − 3/2 ·
√
αF (A2)
(A2) states that in the absence of enforcement problems, private banking is more eﬃcient than
state banking: the highest deposit rate that the state bank could oﬀer is the rate which makes the
marginal depositor located at distance xi = 1/(2n) from private bank i just indiﬀerent between
private bank i and the state bank. In the case of such a tie, we assume that the depositor goes to
private bank i. Of course, any depositor located at xi < 1/(2n) will strictly prefer (the nearest)
bank i over the state bank. The justiﬁcation of this assumption arises from the transition and/or
development context we have in mind here: the state bank, which under (A2) faces a horizontal
average cost curve, pre-dates any private bank in a sense that the ﬁxed cost of setting up the state
bank is long bygone (making the state bank’s ﬁxed cost now eﬀectively zero). In contrast, any
private bank which contemplates entry faces a rectangular hyperbolic average cost curve because
it has to bear a positive ﬁxed set-up cost.
Three types of pure strategy equilibria are possible in this game (see Table 1 below): “high”
Table 1: Description of equilibria.
Equilibrium Type of banking demanded
High (HE) q = 1 private only Di = 1/n
Intermediate (IE) q = 0 state and private 0 < Di < 1/n
Low (LE) q = 0 state only Di = 0
equilibrium (HE) where all banking is undertaken by private banks, “intermediate” equilibrium
12Notice that this assumption is biased against the state bank’s deposit contracts, as harsher punishment of
opportunistic behavior will provide greater incentive for private banks to honor their deposit contracts.
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(IE) with both the state and private banks enjoying positive demand for deposit contracts, and
“low” equilibrium (LE) where only the state bank is operational. To ease the exposition of our
results, we introduce the following additional notation:
λ¯ ≡ 1−
√
αF
1 + r
, λ˜1 ≡ 1− r − rs(2− γ)(1+ r) , λ˜2 ≡ 1−
r− rs
γ(1+ r)
, (7)
n˜ ≡ r(1− γ)− rs − γ(1− λ(1 + r))
2F (1− γ) . (8)
These cut-oﬀs arise from the analysis of (i) an opportunistic bank’s decision to comply with (if
λ ≥ λ¯) or breach (if λ < λ˜1) all its deposit contracts; (ii) an honest bank’s decision to enter the
industry, given the low demand in the presence of breaching opportunistic banks (if λ > λ˜2); and
(iii) demand for private bank deposits in IE being necessarily smaller than that in HE (if n < n˜).
Proposition 1 Assume (A1) and (A2). A unique (pure strategy) equilibrium exists and it is of
type:
(i) HE, if λ ≥ λ¯. Then ri = r −
√
αF , Di =
√
F/α, and n =
√
α/F (i = 1, . . . , n);
(ii) IE, if λ˜2 ≤ λ < min{λ¯, λ˜1}. Then ri = [r(1 − γ) + rs + γ(1 − λ(1 + r))]/[2(1 − γ)],
Di = 2 · [r(1− γ)− rs − γ(1− λ(1 + r))]/α and n < n˜ (i = 1, . . . , n);
(iii) LE, if λ < λ˜2. Then Di = 0 (i = 1, . . . , n), and n = 0.
Note that the equilibria derived in the proposition are all pooling. It can be easily established
that a separating equilibrium (in the non-trivial case of IE) does not arise in this game. This is
because any positive demand for private banks’ deposit contracts, which leads to ex post positive
proﬁts, will stimulate entry by both types of banks, given that the ﬁxed entry cost is the same for
either type of bank, while an opportunistic bank can costlessly mimic an honest bank’s deposit
rate oﬀer.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 1. HE exists when the enforcement of deposit contracts is
suﬃciently good. A high enough probability of penalty under the enforced deposit contract forces
every opportunistic private bank to behave honestly. Consequently, all depositors prefer private
banking over state banking, with the marginal depositor being indiﬀerent between the two nearest
private banks. The equilibrium demand for private banking (as determined by the location of the
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marginal depositor) enters the proﬁt function of the private bank which sets its deposit rate at
the proﬁt-maximizing level. All banks being identical in this equilibrium, the symmetric problem
has the unique solution speciﬁed by Proposition 1(i). Assumption (A2) is necessary to ensure
that the marginal depositor gets as large a payoﬀ from private banking as he would from state
banking.13
Figure 2: Equilibria in the benchmark case (assuming rs = r − 3/2 ·
√
αF ).
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In both IE and LE, all opportunistic banks cheat because the enforcement probability is
relatively low. The location of the marginal depositor in either equilibrium determines the proﬁts
of the honest bank which, should it enter the industry, will be setting its deposit rate at the proﬁt-
maximizing level. This level is feasible—gives a positive ex post proﬁt—when the proportion of
opportunistic banks is relatively low while the probability of deposit contract enforcement is
relatively high. In such a case, honest banks enter, and the expected payoﬀ from private banking
is as large as that from the state bank, provided that the depositor is located close enough to a
private bank. If, in contrast, the proportion of opportunistic banks is relatively large while the
enforcement probability is relatively small, the rate that maximizes an honest bank’s proﬁt, given
the demand, has to be set at too high a level for the honest bank to be able to make a positive
(ex post) proﬁt. Hence, the honest banks do not enter, and the foreseen absence of the honest
banks in combination with the certainty of breach by an opportunistic bank, makes state deposit
13HE is therefore a standard solution of the “circular city” model, except for the additional condition on the
value of the enforcement probability (Salop 1979, Freixas and Rochet 1997).
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contracts more attractive compared to private deposit contracts. Lack of demand for private
deposit contracts translates into no entry by any private bank. Therefore, in this parameter
space, LE prevails. It immediately follows that in the absence of a suﬃciently high quality of
institutions, state banking is the only viable form of savings mobilization.
Notice that due to the symmetry of the model, the private banks that enter in either HE or
IE will (a) locate equidistantly from each other, and (b) oﬀer the same deposit rate. The latter
is particularly important in IE: irrespective of the equilibrium behavior of opportunistic banks
(who breach all of their deposit contracts), the equilibrium deposit rate of any private bank is
determined by the proﬁt maximization problem of an honest bank: given the certainty of breach,
an opportunistic bank will not want to signal its type by posting a deposit rate diﬀerent from
that of an honest bank (otherwise it will lose all of its potential depositors).
Observe also that in the densely shaded area of Fig. 2 HE and IE co-exist, while in the sparsely
shaded area there is no pure strategy equilibrium. The intuition behind the co-existence of HE
and IE in the densely shaded area is straightforward. In this parameter space, both q = 1 and
q = 0 can be optimal (depending on the level of demand). If all players believe that opportunistic
banks breach in equilibrium, then depositors’ demand for a given private bank and the deposit rate
set in accordance with the proﬁt maximization problem of the honest banks (given this demand)
is consistent with IE. Thus the belief held by the players that opportunistic banks breach leads
to IE being realized. To check that it is unproﬁtable for a given opportunistic bank to deviate
unilaterally from the equilibrium strategy to breach, note that the net beneﬁt from deviating
(r−ri where ri is set at the level consistent with IE) is smaller than the net beneﬁt from following
the equilibrium strategy of breaching (1 + r − λ(1 + r)), because λ < 1 + ri. Similarly, if the
players believe that in equilibrium all opportunistic banks comply with their deposit contracts,
then the level of demand for a given private bank deposit contract and the equilibrium deposit
rate determined through proﬁt-maximization of an honest bank are going to be consistent with
HE, which leads to HE being realized. A unilateral deviation from the equilibrium strategy to
comply is suboptimal again: the net beneﬁt of a unilateral breach, 1 + r − λ(1 + r), is smaller in
this range of λ-values than the beneﬁt of following the equilibrium strategy of compliance, r− ri,
where ri = r −
√
αF .
Remark 1 The demand for state deposit contracts is greater when the enforcement probability is
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smaller or the proportion of opportunistic banks is larger.
This result immediately follows from Proposition 1, by noting that in IE ∂Di/∂λ > 0, ∂Di/∂γ < 0,
Ds = 1− nDi, and Di|LE < Di|IE < Di|HE.
Remark 2 When institutional quality is relatively poor, non-existence of the state bank leads to
ﬁnancial disintermediation.
Non-existence of the state bank in the present setting is qualitatively equivalent to rs = 0:
in deciding whether to deposit his cash holding in a private bank, the depositor compares the
expected gain from private banking with the certain outcome from doing nothing and keeping
intact his 1 unit of cash. In the parameter space where IE and LE exist (with rs = 0) in
the statement of Proposition 1, non-existence of the state bank implies that the proportion of
depositors Ds that would have preferred state deposit contracts now prefer to keep their money
“under the mattress”, in the face of unchecked opportunistic behavior of some private banks.
2.3 Enforcement externality
This section considers a modiﬁcation of the benchmark model. The modiﬁcation exploits the
idea that the resources devoted to enforcement of deposit contracts are ﬁxed and therefore the
eﬀectiveness of enforcement (speciﬁcally, its likelihood) will decline with the rise of the fraction
of breached market contracts. Let λ(q) = λ0(1 − δ(1 − q)), where λ0 is the exogenous level of
enforcement available in the economy. Then in HE we have λ0 while in IE and LE the probability
becomes λ0(1 − δ). Repeating the analysis of section 2.2 under this modiﬁcation, the bounds
which characterize the equilibria in section 2.2 are re-calculated as follows:
if λ0 ≥ λ¯ then V γ(q = 1) ≥ V γ(q = 0), (9)
if λ0 < λ˜1/(1− δ) ≡ λ˜e1 then V γ(q = 1) < V γ(q = 0), (10)
if λ0 ≤ λ˜2/(1− δ) ≡ λ˜e2 then r − r∗i ≤ 0 where r∗i = argmax{V 1−γ(ri)}, (11)
and the analysis leads to a statement similar to that of Proposition 1 except that λ must now be
substituted with λ0 in HE or λ0(1 − δ) in IE and LE. An important diﬀerence in results of the
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enforcement externality case compared to the benchmark case arises from the observation that
for γ ∈ (0, 1), λ˜e1 ≥ 1 if δ ≥ δˆ where
δˆ ≡ r − rs
1 + r
, (12)
with δˆ ∈ (0, 1) for any γ ∈ (0, 1), and in such a case, the “if” part of the statement in (10) is
trivially satisﬁed.
Remark 3 For a suﬃciently large enforcement externality, δ > δˆ, the equilibrium of the game
with relatively high institutional quality is no longer unique.
Figure 3: Equilibria of the game with enforcement externality δ ≥ δˆ
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Figure 3 illustrates Remark 3. Intuitively, a relatively high institutional quality is a necessary and
suﬃcient condition of HE—which is then a unique equilibrium of the game—when the externality
is not too large. In such a case, every opportunistic bank prefers to honor its deposit contracts
for any positive demand it faces. The bank chooses compliance, rather than breach, because the
expected punishment for breach is larger than its beneﬁt due to a high enforcement externality.
A not too large enforcement externality means that the behavior of others does not impact on
a given breaching bank’s chances of being punished. The punishment probability, however, falls
as the enforcement externality gets larger. For high enough value of the externality, compliance
is no longer an unconditional optimal choice (and therefore relatively high quality of institutions
is only a necessary condition for HE). Due to the large externality, compliance is individually
optimal if every other opportunistic bank complies because wide-spread compliance guarantees
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that in case of a single breach all of the ﬁxed enforcement resources are devoted to punishing this
breach. But if every other opportunistic bank breaches, breach becomes optimal since the ﬁxed
enforcement resources are spread too thinly to detect an individual breach with a high probability.
The realized equilibrium is, therefore, likely to depend on beliefs regarding institutional quality,
which may, in turn, be determined by historical factors, such as whether or not there have been
recent episodes of ﬁnancial instability.
2.4 The benchmark with government subsidies
Let the depositor’s (net) return from the state deposit contract be
r0s − α/(2π) + s = rs + s, (13)
where s ∈ (0, 1) is the subsidy rate per state deposit contract. The description of feasible equilibria
is now given by the following table:
Table 2: Description of equilibria in the benchmark with a subsidy.
Equilibrium Breach by opportunists? Type of banking demanded
HES q = 1 state and private Di < 1/n
IES q = 0 state and private Di < 1/n
LES q = 0 state only Di = 0
The analysis of section 2.2 is straightforwardly amended to account for (13) and, in the case
of high equilibrium with a subsidy (HES) the observation that the marginal depositor located at
a distance x˘i between two private banks i and i+1 is now indiﬀerent between the nearest private
bank, say bank i, and the state bank (rather than two private banks, as in HE of the benchmark).
Remark 4 If s ≥ r − rs then there is no demand for private deposit contracts.
Clearly, a large subsidy which allows the state bank to oﬀer a net return on its deposit contracts
in excess of the exogenously given rate r completely eliminates any competition by private banks.
To exclude this uninteresting possibility, it is henceforth assumed that the subsidy is not too large.
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With a positive but not too large subsidy, the threshold values in (7) and (8) now become:
λ˘ ≡ 1− r − rs − s
2(1 + r)
, λ˘1 ≡ 1− r − rs − s(2− γ)(1+ r) , λ˘2 ≡ 1−
r − rs − s
γ(1+ r)
, (14)
n˘ ≡ 1
F
(
r − r − rs − s
2α
)
. (15)
The conclusions of the analysis with the subsidy are then summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 Assume (A1), (A2), (13) and s < r − rs. A unique (pure strategy) equilibrium
exists and it is of type:
(i) HES, if λ ≥ λ˘. Then ri = (r + rs + s)/2, Di = (r− rs − s)/α, and n < n˘ (i = 1, . . . , n);
(ii) IES, if λ˘2 ≤ λ < λ˘1. Then ri = [r(1 − γ) + γ(1 − λ(1 + r)) + rs + s]/[2(1 − γ)], Di =
2 · [r(1− γ)− rs − s − γ(1− λ(1 + r))]/α and n < n˘ (i = 1, . . . , n);
(iii) LES, if λ < λ˘2. Then Di = 0 (i = 1, . . . , n), and n = 0.
The eﬀect of the subsidy is to create a positive demand for state deposit contracts even when all
private banks honor their deposit rate promise without fail. The diagram depicting Prop. 2 is
drawn below (as before, there is no pure strategy equilibrium in the shaded area). It can also be
Figure 4: Equilibria in the benchmark case with a subsidy (0 < s < r − rs).
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easily checked that the new threshold of the institutional quality for the HES, λ˘, is higher than
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that for HE, λ¯ when the subsidy is relatively substantial:
s > r − rs − 2
√
αF (and s < r − rs). (16)
If it is additionally assumed that rs = r−3/2
√
αF (ie the largest it could be under the assumption
(A2)), then λ˘ > λ¯ for any 0 < s < r − rs. Namely, the subsidy makes it harder for private banks
to compete with the state bank and hence erodes opportunistic banks’ incentive not to cheat their
depositors. There is, therefore, a greater need for good institutional quality in order to attain the
high equilibrium when the state bank is subsidized.14 Reducing or removing government subsidies
from state banks will therefore expand the high equilibrium region and release resources that could
be used for institution building (e.g., employing enough bank supervisors) thereby providing a
double beneﬁt for the economy. Note that once the economy is in the high equilibrium region, the
state bank disappears altogether, provided subsidies are withdrawn; there is no need to privatize.
3 Empirical evidence
One of the predictions of our model is that where private and government-owned banks co-exist,
the former will oﬀer a higher interest rate to depositors, reﬂecting the higher risk. Available
data suggests that this is indeed the case in a range of countries. For example in Russia in 2002
Sberbank—the state owned savings bank—oﬀered interest rates between 8 and 13% to depositors
while the average in the entire banking sector was 16.5%.15 In Romania, in March 2005 the
state-owned savings bank CEC oﬀered the lowest deposit rate on the market at 8% for one-year
deposits, while its top competitors oﬀered rates above 11%.16 In China today, as in Korea in the
1980s,17 a kerb market of non-bank ﬁnancial institutions co-exists with the state-owned savings
banks by oﬀering higher interest rates. Even in developed ﬁnancial systems, publicly-owned banks
are perceived as less risky and are therefore able to raise funds at a lower cost than privately-
owned banks. In Germany, for example, the two most risky of the German public banks have
14Introducing the subsidy assumption into the analysis of the enforcement externality case of section 2.3 does not
yield any further interesting results.
15Kandell (2002).
16http://www.seeurope.net/en/Story.php?StoryID=54970&LangID=1
17Lee, Lee and Lee (2002, pp. 17–35)
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the same long term risk rating as Deutsche Bank (Moody’s Aa3 in April 2005, all others score
better).18 All publicly-owned banks score better than the other top German banks (Dresdner
Bank, Commerzbank and Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank).
Another prediction of the model is that the demand for state deposit contracts is inversely
related to the probability of deposit contract enforcement and the proportion of opportunistic
private banks. While, due to data availability, we are not able to test this prediction directly, we
can nevertheless provide empirical evidence on the determinants of the share in state controlled
banks in total bank assets for a large number of countries, which can shed additional light on the
empirical validity of the model’s predictions. The rest of this section, therefore, aims to provide
such evidence. The explanatory variables we utilize purport to capture the variables suggested
by the theoretical model. The theoretical variables are, of course, not directly observed, so we
use the best available proxies for these variables. In addition, in order to check for robustness to
more general speciﬁcations, we also utilize legal origin variables. These allow us to control for
the historical determinants of the share of state banks, which may reﬂect political factors. This
section is structured as follows. Subsection 3.1 explains the measurement of the variables we use
in the regressions and their sources. Subsection 3.2 presents the models that are estimated and
discusses the estimationmethod. Subsection 3.3 presents summary statistics of the data, including
pairwise correlations between the variables. Subsection 3.4 presents the empirical estimates, while
subsection 3.5 contains their interpretation and discussion. Additional robustness checks, which
utilize alternative measures of the dependent variable, are reported and discussed in subsection
3.6. Appendix B contains all relevant tables.
3.1 Measurement and data sources
3.1.1 Dependent variable: gi
We utilize the comprehensive dataset of the share of state-owned or state controlled bank assets
as a share of total commercial bank assets compiled by Barth et al. (2001) as part of the World
Bank survey on bank regulations and supervisory practices (SOB50).19 The data describing state
18www.moodys.com/
19The share is denoted here by gi which in terms of our theoretical model is the same as 1 − µ.
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Figure 5: Distribution of SOB50
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ownership are primarily from 1999, with some responses in late 1998 and early 2000. Data are
available for 108 countries.20 The SOB50 variable is not evenly distributed, as is shown in Fig.
5. 28% of the countries in the sample have no state banks. There are no observations of 100%
state ownership, with the highest observed share being 97.1%.21 However, this does not mean
that the “low equilibrium” does not exist. The World Bank survey did not receive responses on
state-owned banking from countries such as China and Vietnam and did not include countries
such as Iran, Libya, Syria and Algeria. All these countries had 99–100% state ownership in the
1995 dataset of La Porta et al. (2002). Moreover there are no observations for SOB50 from some
former Soviet Republics, such as Azerbaijan, Belarus, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and African
countries, such as Congo, Sierra Leone and Somalia, which are at the bottom of the distribution
in terms of regulatory quality and rule of law.
20Only 83 out of these 108 countries are used in the regressions because of some missing explanatory variables.
21This observation is for Turkmenistan and it is the highest in the 108 countries sample. In the sample of 83
countries which we use in our regressions, the highest value of SOB50 is 80% in India.
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3.1.2 Explanatory variables
λ variable This variable captures the likelihood that cheated depositors will receive compen-
sation. There are problems with measuring this probability directly. A dummy variable showing
whether an explicit deposit insurance scheme is in place gives little information on how credi-
ble the promise of compensation is in practice. Some countries with explicit deposit insurance
schemes have dragged their feet over paying out compensation (e.g. 5 years average waiting time
to receive compensation in Kenya), while other countries without explicit guarantees have in fact
speedily compensated depositors (e.g. Thailand and Slovenia).22 In the model the compensation
comes from ﬁnes levied against opportunistic banks. Again, there are problems with measuring
the probability that legal action is taken against opportunistic banks. Firstly, while some data on
the number of bank failures and legal action against bank directors are available in Barth et al.
(2001), there is no distinction made between banks that failed because of bad (but not corrupt)
lending decisions and those that failed because of managers behaving opportunistically. Secondly,
countries that do not report any bank failures could either have no opportunistic banks or tacitly
support banks to prevent bank failures.
Therefore our preferred way of creating a proxy for λ is to focus on the regulatory environment.
One comprehensive database is the Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a) database of
governance indicators. One of their variables, “regulatory quality”, is constructed from a survey
of country experts’ opinions on the eﬀectiveness of regulation in establishing private markets.23
While the regulatory quality index includes measures of “market unfriendly” policies such as price
controls and exclusion of foreign competitors from the market, which are not directly indicative
of institutional quality, it also includes highly relevant survey results on the adequacy of bank
regulation and the eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial regulation. Importantly, none of the survey questions
on regulatory quality is based on the extent of state-ownership in the economy.
22There are some data in Barth et al. (2001) on the average time taken to fully compensate depositors the last
time a bank failed, but these data are limited, in that they only exist for 37 out of 108 countries in their dataset.
23Another potential candidate for a λ proxy would be the rule of law indicator in the same database, which
contains questions on the enforceability of private contracts and protection of ﬁnancial wealth from expropriation.
However, the indicator also incorporates information on the extent of the black economy, kidnaping of foreigners,
tax evasion and personal safety, making this too broad an index for proxying λ.
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A second λ proxy utilized in this paper is the “Rule of Law” indicator from the Knack and
Keefer IRIS 3 database. International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) compiles this dataset and calls
this indicator “Law and Order Tradition”. The variable ranges in value from 0 to 6 and “reﬂects
the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions
to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes”. Higher scores indicate: “sound political
institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly succession of power”. Low scores
indicate “a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to settle claims”. We use
data which describe rule of law in 1997.
γ variable The γ proxy is intended to capture the proportion of potentially opportunistic
banks in the system. The Barth et al. (2001) database of bank regulations and supervisory
practices contains data on speciﬁc legal requirements for entry into the banking system, which
could, in principle, be used to proxy the probability that opportunistic banks will be granted a
bank license. However, the database was constructed in 1999 and by this time most emerging
markets had tightened up their prudential requirements in response to a combination of banking
crises, technical advice from the international ﬁnancial institutions and (in Central and Eastern
Europe) as part of the EU accession process. There is, therefore, minimal variation in entry
requirements across countries.24 Also, banking systems that have recently tightened legislation
may retain opportunistic banks from previous periods when licensing requirements were more
lax. Using the 1999 dataset would not capture this. Finally, the question of whether the law is
actually applied or is a mere “paper tiger” would not be addressed.
However, the Barth et al. (2001) database contains speciﬁc details of the regulatory envi-
ronment such as disclosure rules which can provide an alternative way to construct a proxy for
γ. In a regulatory environment that forces banks to disclose information, it is more likely that
opportunistic behavior is detected. Stringent disclosure requirements should therefore deter op-
portunists from applying for a bank license in the ﬁrst place or would force them to leave the
sector once these measures are put in place.25 Our γ variable is constructed from the following
24Except for the minimum capital requirement, which, however, is constant throughout the EU and all EU
accession candidate countries.
25Barth, Caprio and Levine (2002) use a similar index called the “Private Monitoring Index” to measure the
extent of private monitoring in the banking system.
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three entries in the Barth et al. (2001) database of bank regulations: (i) is accrued but unpaid
principal and interest of non-performing loans contained in the income statement (“no” = 1, “yes”
= 0, missing entry = 0), (ii) do banks have to publish consolidated balance sheets, (iii) are risk
management procedures disclosed. The γ proxy is created by adding up the individual dummies,
resulting in an index from 0 to 3.26 The intuition behind this index is that disclosure requirements
regarding non-performing loans and consolidated accounts prevent opportunists from hiding con-
nected lending in their balance sheets or in subsidiary companies. Disclosure of risk management
procedures and international ratings indicate a high level of bank monitoring.
A second variable that may capture the proportion of opportunistic banks in the ﬁnancial
system is the share of foreign banks. Foreign banks are only likely to enter a banking system, if they
can be reasonably sure that the rule of law applies. A corrupt banking sector would not attract
signiﬁcant foreign entry.27 Foreign-owned banks themselves are unlikely to be opportunistic.
Subsidiaries of foreign banks would be supervised and managed to the standards of the parent
company, as the parent company would be liable for covering losses and needs to protect its brand
name and image. A higher share of foreign-owned banks is therefore expected to be associated
with a lower proportion of opportunistic banks in the system. Data on the proportion of total
assets in banks in which foreign banks hold a share of 50% or more are available from the Barth
et al. (2001) database.
q variable The variable q in the model is the probability that an opportunistic bank will
comply with the deposit contract. The results are driven by the perception of depositors regarding
the probability of compliance, which determines the demand for private sector savings deposits.
Measures of depositors’ perceptions of the pervasiveness of opportunistic behavior in the banking
sector are not directly available. There are no public surveys about “trust in banks” analogous
26Our results are robust to alternative deﬁnitions of the disclosure index (such as adding the requirement to
disclose oﬀ-balance sheet items or adding a dummy showing whether the top ten banks are rated by international
agencies).
27Foreign entry may also be restricted by a government trying to protect an ineﬃcient banking sector from
competitors. To that extent the share of foreign banks may also reﬂect “market unfriendly practices”. In that
respect the foreign bank share is like the Kaufmann variable, which also contains an aspect of “market unfriendly
practices”. Including both variables in the regressions may help to disentangle the separate eﬀects of institutional
quality and government policy.
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to the opinion polls which regularly gauge “trust in politicians”. We therefore use a banking
crisis dummy as a proxy for investor perceptions about the probability of opportunistic banks
cheating. If a country has recently experienced major bank failures depositors are likely to become
very cautious about savings in the private sector. The dummy is taken from the comprehensive
dataset by Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) on “episodes of systemic and borderline ﬁnancial crises”.
Systemic banking crises are deﬁned as episodes during which one of the following is observed: (i)
the ratio of non-performing assets to total assets in the banking system exceeds 10%; (ii) the cost
of the rescue operation is at least 2% of GDP; (iii) banking sector problems result in a large scale
nationalization of banks; or (iv) extensive bank runs take place or emergency measures such as
deposit freezes, prolonged bank holidays, or generalized deposit guarantees are enacted by the
government in response to the crisis.
The banking crisis dummy takes the value 1 if there was a banking crisis (ongoing or starting)
between 1990 and 1999. It should be noted that a change in state ownership can occur in two
ways after a banking crisis: either savers decide to switch their deposits to state-owned institutions
after a collapse of private banks, or the government takes a controlling stake in the failing banks
to reassure savers that their deposits will be guaranteed. In the second case, savers who are not
happy to retain their deposits in the nationalized bank normally have the option of shifting their
deposits into the private sector.28
s variable Data on the amount of government subsidies given to state-owned banks are
not available. Subsidies could take a variety of diﬀerent forms such as direct budgetary sup-
port, recapitalization, preferential loans from the central bank, buying of non-performing loans
by government agencies and guarantees which allow state banks to obtain cheap credit in the in-
ternational capital markets. We attempt to capture the government’s propensity to subsidize with
a number of diﬀerent proxies.29 The ﬁrst proxy is total government consumption as a proportion
of GDP, with the intuition that the size of the government sector is an indication of how much
28If they choose not to do so, this is tantamount to revealing a preference for the state bank.
29The closest available proxy for government subsidies to state banks is the “government subsidies to private
and public sector enterprises” variable used by Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998). However, the data-set
was constructed averaging subsidy levels between 1983–1991, which is well before the time period of our study.
Moreover, it is only available for 26 countries. When we include it as an explanatory variable in our regressions it
is never signiﬁcant.
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the government intervenes in the economy. The (limited) data-set is taken from the World Devel-
opment Indicators. The second proxy is taken from Beck, Clark, Groﬀ, Keefer and Walsh (2001)
political economy database and concerns the political orientation of the government. A dummy
variable is constructed which takes the value 1 for each country that had predominantly left-wing
governments in the period from 1995–1997. The intuition here is that left-wing governments have
traditionally been more interventionist than center or right-of-center governments. The last of
the proxies for propensity to subsidize is based on the IMF MONA database, which records the
timing and size of countries’ IMF loans. The variable reﬂects the total amount of loans agreed
in the period 1990 to 1998 as a percentage of 1998 GDP. Given the IMF’s neo-liberal agenda in
the 1990s, one would expect that the more heavily a country relied on IMF funding the more it
would have to be seen to subscribe to the “Washington consensus” and therefore would be less
able to subsidize state banks.
A summary of all the variables and their sources is shown in Table 3. Table 4 contains a list
of countries used in our regressions, together with their key variables.
3.1.3 Control variables
Legal origin variables According to recent research into law and ﬁnance, diﬀerences in legal
traditions may help to explain diﬀerences in ﬁnancial development.30 Legal traditions diﬀer in
terms of the priority they give to private markets versus state power and in how well private
property rights are protected. For the purpose of this analysis legal origin may help to proxy
government preferences in maintaining a state-controlled banking system and path dependence in
economies which had a large share of state ownership in the past. These factors are independent
of the choices depositors make regarding where to place their deposits, which is the main focus of
this investigation.
The ﬁve legal origin dummies (Anglo-Saxon common law, French civil law, German civil law,
Scandinavian civil code and Socialist/Communist law) used are taken from La Porta et al. (1997).
We also include additional countries into the socialist origin group, which were excluded from the
original sample in La Porta et al. (1997).31 For the examination of state ownership of banking,
30La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Barth et al. (2002).
31Albania, Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia.
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the eﬀect of the socialist legal origin dummy may be expected to be positive, as the socialist
countries started the 1990s with close to 100% state ownership of banking and slowly privatized
state-owned banks over the decade while licensing new banks to provide private banking services
alongside the declining state sector. Countries with Anglo-Saxon legal origin are more likely to be
market-oriented and therefore a lower share of state-ownership in banking is expected. Countries
with French, Scandinavian or German legal origins are generally seen as taking a more state-
centered approach to banking and hence may be expected to have a higher proportion of state
ownership.
3.2 Methodology
Firstly, we report raw correlations between each variable and the extent of bank ownership.
Secondly, we report maximum likelihood estimation results using the Tobit estimation technique,
since our dependent variable, the share of banking system assets held by state-owned or state-
controlled banks, is a limited dependent variable ranging from 0% to theoretically 100%. In our
sample about a quarter of the observations are at the lower limit, i.e. no state banks. There are
no observations at the upper limit, with the highest observed share used in the regressions being
80%.
Our theoretical model implies that a single mechanism determines both the outcome when the
dependent variable is equal to zero and the magnitude of the dependent variable if it is greater
than zero. The Tobit model was developed for exactly this type of problem.32 In the Tobit model
there is a latent dependent variable y∗ = xβ +u. y∗ is not observed, but a variable y is observed.
The observed variable has the following properties:
y = y∗ if y∗ > 0 and y = 0 if y∗ ≤ 0.
It would be possible to estimate the two outcomes separately. However, as we argue that the
same dependent variables explain both outcomes and as the dataset is limited (to at most 83
observations for which all the data are available) it is important that we use the statistically most
eﬃcient technique, i.e. the Tobit.33 We report the results both excluding and including the legal
32See, for example, Maddala (1983).
33We have also performed the regressions using OLS to compare our results to previous literature in this ﬁeld,
e.g., La Porta et al. (2002). Using OLS does not materially alter our results.
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origin variables.34 The basic speciﬁcation is the following:
gi =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a + bλ + cγ, if RHS > 0
0 otherwise
(13)
gi =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a + bλ + cγ + e Anglo-Sax + f Germ + g Scand + h Social, if RHS > 0
0 otherwise
(14)
Secondly, we report regression results for simultaneous tests of γ, λ and q on the state share
in the banking system both with and without the legal origin dummies as control variables:
gi =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a + bλ + cγ + dq, if RHS > 0
0 otherwise
(15)
gi =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a + bλ + cγ + dq + e Anglo-Sax + f Germ+ g Scand + h Social, if RHS > 0
0 otherwise
(16)
Finally, we include the diﬀerent proxies for the subsidies variable in the equations and report
regression results for simultaneous tests of γ, λ, q and s on the state share in the banking system.
Again we report results both with and without the legal origin dummies as control variables:
gi =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a + bλ + cγ + dq + es, if RHS > 0
0 otherwise
(17)
gi =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a + bλ + cγ + dq + es + f Anglo-Sax + g Germ+ h Scand + i Social, if RHS > 0
0 otherwise
(18)
34We use French legal origin as the baseline group as this is the largest group of countries. However, similar
results are obtained when using the Anglo-Saxon legal origin as the base group.
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3.3 Summary statistics
There was considerable cross-country variation in the share of assets of state-controlled banks
in banking systems in 1998 (see Fig. 5). SOB50 ranges from 0% to 97.1%. The mean share
of banks in which the state had a 50% share in 1999 was 20.6%. Predictably, the (formerly)
socialist countries had the highest share of government owned banks with a mean of 32.11%. The
same countries also had the highest incidence of banking crises and the lowest mean regulatory
quality. Scandinavian origin countries showed the highest level of regulatory quality overall. Table
5 contains the summary statistics for our main variables.
The pairwise correlations reported in Table 6 provide a ﬁrst conﬁrmation of our hypotheses.
The percentage of the banking system’s assets in state-controlled banks is positively correlated
with the incidence of a banking crisis in the 1990s. State control over banking assets is neg-
atively linked with the quality of regulation, rule of law, the extent of disclosure requirements
on banks and the share of foreign banks in the ﬁnancial sector. The three suggested proxies for
s are only very weakly correlated with state-ownership of banks, but the signs are as expected
with larger governments and left-wing governments being positively and IMF-funded governments
being negatively related to state-owned banking.
The proxies for γ, λ and q are not highly correlated with each other. This is encouraging,
because γ and λ could be strongly linked in principle. The higher the probability of oﬀending
banks being caught and punished, the lower is the incentive for opportunists to enter into the
banking system. The correlation coeﬃcient between the indicator of regulatory quality and the
disclosure requirements on banks is 0.328, indicating that the two variables capture diﬀerent
aspects of institutional quality. The broader “rule of law” proxy for λ is even less strongly linked
to the γ proxy, with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.264. The two proxies for λ (regulatory quality
and rule of law) are strongly correlated with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.598. As expected,
there is a negative correlation between the γ and λ proxies and the incidence of banking crises.
Government consumption is positively correlated with rule of law and regulatory quality, which
could reﬂect higher tax compliance in countries with more developed enforcement institutions.
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3.4 Empirical results
Tables 7, 8 and 9 present the Tobit estimation results for equations (13)–(14), (15)–(16) and (17)–
(18), respectively. The letters A and C signify the two alternative proxies used for λ (regulatory
quality and rule of law, respectively). Letter B signiﬁes a further reﬁnement of the regulatory
quality variable, which is explained below. Letter D signiﬁes that the two γ proxies are used
simultaneously with regulatory quality as the proxy for λ. In Table 9, the additional digit accom-
panying the number of the regression, (17D) or (18D), refers to one of the three diﬀerent proxies
for s.
The proxies for γ and λ are mostly statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% or at the 5% level. The
regression coeﬃcients are also relatively robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the equations. The
signiﬁcance level and coeﬃcient for q are especially stable across diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the
equation.35
Equations (13A) and (14A) use the raw regulatory quality index, which is shown to be highly
signiﬁcant and of the expected sign, with higher regulatory quality decreasing the share of state
banks. Similarly, the disclosure index is of the expected sign, with higher disclosure requirements
lowering the share of state owned banking. It is signiﬁcant at 5% level in both speciﬁcations of
the regression. None of the legal origin variables is statistically signiﬁcant.
Equations (13B) and (14B) aim to test whether there is a cut-oﬀ point for λ (λ¯ in our theo-
retical model, see Fig. 2) above which high equilibrium prevails. The regulatory quality variable
is, therefore, split into a low regulatory quality spline (80% of the sample) and a high regulatory
quality spline (20% of the sample). While the lower regulatory quality spline remains signiﬁcant,
the high regulatory quality spline loses its statistical signiﬁcance. This indicates that increases in
λ cease to have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on state ownership once a certain threshold of reg-
35To address the question whether institutional quality is merely a proxy for the level of development, we included
GDP per capita in some regressions. Regressions including GDP per capita showed the signiﬁcance level of the
regulatory quality and disclosure indices remaining signiﬁcant at the 5% level and the banking crises dummy at
the 1% level. The variables’ coeﬃcients were only insigniﬁcantly aﬀected. GDP per capita itself is not signiﬁcant
(p-value of 0.646). If GDP per capita is included in the regression instead of the regulatory quality variable, it
becomes signiﬁcant at the 10% level. GDP per capita may therefore be used as an imperfect proxy for institutional
quality, but the level of development does not drive the results.
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ulatory quality is reached.36 The estimates for the disclosure requirements are almost unchanged
and none of the legal origin dummies is statistically signiﬁcant.
Equations (13C) and (14C) utilize the Knack and Keefer rule of law indicator instead of the
Kaufmann regulatory quality variable as the λ proxy. These regressions are based on a smaller
number of observations than regressions (14A) and (14B). Again, rule of law has eﬀects of the
expected sign (higher scores lower the share of state-owned banks) and is statistically signiﬁcant,
at the 10% level if the legal origins are excluded and at the 1% level if legal origins are included.
For the ﬁrst time the German dummy and socialist legal origin indicator become statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10% and 1% level respectively (equation (14C)). These results suggest that
there are some aspects of contract enforcement in the banking systems, which are captured less
well by the rule of law indicator than by the regulatory quality index.
The equations (13D) and (14D) include the two γ proxies—the disclosure index and the foreign
ownership share—simultaneously. Foreign ownership is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level,
while the disclosure index remains signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The regulatory quality variable’s
signiﬁcance is somewhat reduced in regression 14D to 5%, which may reﬂect the overlap between
the foreign ownership variable and the “market unfriendly practices” of the Kaufmann variable,
or the reduced number of observations for which all data are available. If the former is the case,
however, the fact that the regulatory quality variable remains signiﬁcant conﬁrms that “pure”
quality of regulation is an important explanatory factor.
In Table 8 the banking crisis dummy enters, as expected, with a positive coeﬃcient, which
is very robust and highly signiﬁcant mostly at the 1% level. With one exception, its estimated
coeﬃcient is very stable across the diﬀerent regressions. The qualitative nature of the rest of the
results remains unchanged and the regression coeﬃcients of the γ proxy remain stable. However,
the statistical signiﬁcance of some variables is somewhat weakened, especially the rule of law
variable in regressions (15C).
Regressions (15A) and (16A) conﬁrm the results of regression (13A) and (14A), with better
regulatory quality and higher disclosure requirements reducing the share of state-owned banking.
36Our results are robust to diﬀerent splits of the regulatory quality index. The smaller the proportion of the
sample in the top group, the greater the signiﬁcance of the bottom group. The upper part of the regulatory quality
spline only becomes signiﬁcant if it contains more than 20% of the sample.
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Both variables are signiﬁcant at the 5% level if the legal origins are excluded and at the 1% level
in the regression with the legal origins. The banking crisis dummy raises state ownership and is
signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Regression (16B) re-conﬁrms the existence of a λ-threshold: among the countries with the
highest scores of regulatory quality there is no longer a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of further raising
regulatory quality. In regression (15B) however, the lower spline is just not statistically signiﬁcant
(11%). However, a split of 15% in the top spline and 85% in the bottom spline restores the
signiﬁcance of the bottom group.
Regression (15C) shows that the rule of law indicator still has the expected eﬀect of lowering
state ownership though slightly less statistically signiﬁcant if the banking crisis dummy is included
in the speciﬁcation. The latter enters the regression positively, as expected, and is signiﬁcant at the
1% level. If the legal origin variables are included into the estimation, as is the case in regression
(16C), the rule of law indicator improves its statistical signiﬁcance to the 5% level. However, this
reduces the signiﬁcance of the banking crisis dummy to the 10% level. The sensitivity of some of
the results in regressions (15C) and (16C) can partly be ascribed to the smaller sample. It may,
however, also indicate that the rule of law variable is too broad as a proxy for λ.
Equations (15D) and (16D) show that the second γ proxy of foreign ownership is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. It again slightly undermines the signiﬁcance of the regulatory quality
variable to signiﬁcance at the 5% level, but the other γ proxy and the q proxy retain signiﬁcance
at the 1% level.
Regressions (17D-1)–(18D-3) in Table 9 examine the eﬀect of the diﬀerent proxies for s on
government ownership of banks. None of the three proxies for government subsidies is statistically
signiﬁcant and only the dummy for left-wing governments is of the expected sign. There is
therefore very little direct evidence for subsidies maintaining state ownership of banks. In two of
the regressions, however, the Anglo-Saxon legal origin variable is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. To
the extent that Anglo-Saxon legal origin is indicative of a lesser degree of political interference in
the economy and therefore in the banking sector as argued for example in La Porta et al. (1997)
this result can be interpreted as providing some, albeit limited, support for the “political view”
of government ownership of banks.
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3.5 Interpretation of empirical results
The results suggest that after a decade of aggressive privatization, ﬁxed country eﬀects and legal
traditions have little inﬂuence on the degree of government ownership of banks. Instead, good
institutions appear to be the key to fostering a private banking system. High de facto regulatory
quality appears to inspire conﬁdence in private sector banking practices and hence reduces the
need for state banks as a safe haven for private sector deposits. Similarly, strict disclosure rules,
which allow private monitoring of bank behavior, appear to deter opportunists from entering
a market. Systemic banking crises seem to alter public perceptions about the risks involved in
transacting with private banks. A past banking crisis appears to lower demand for private banking
services and encourages depositors to keep their savings in either state banks or banks that have
(at least partially) been taken over by the state in the resolution of a banking crisis. Finally, we
ﬁnd only very limited support, if any, for politically motivated subsidies maintaining the state’s
share in the banking sector. None of the political variables is statistically signiﬁcant, whereas the
institutional variables are consistently signiﬁcant, have the predicted signs and relatively stable
coeﬃcients across diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the regressions.
The economic importance of these results can be examined by calculating various policy eﬀects.
In order to illustrate the order of magnitude of these eﬀects we focus on Model 15A, which is
our preferred speciﬁcation.37 Increasing regulatory quality by one standard deviation reduces the
share of government assets in the banking sector by 8.54%, which is equivalent to just over one
third of the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Increasing disclosure by one standard
deviation reduces the share of government ownership in banking by 6.51%, which is just over one
quarter of its standard deviation. To shed further light on the magnitudes involved, we ran an
ancillary regression based on speciﬁcation 15A, which suggests that improving from the worst
quartile of regulatory quality to the best reduces government ownership in banking by 21.4%.38
The same regression suggests that improving disclosure from the worst to the best practice can
reduce government ownership by an additional 21.0%. These eﬀects are quite large and therefore
37In the sense that it is the most general speciﬁcation in which all the explanatory variables suggested by the
most general version of the model are included, measured by our preferred proxies and pass the test of statistical
signiﬁcance.
38These results are available from the authors upon request.
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economically signiﬁcant. Consequently, it appears that the impact of institutions on government
ownership of banks is of ﬁrst-order importance.
To sum up, the results presented in Section 3.4 are consistent with the predictions of the
theoretical model. Speciﬁcally, the share of state control over bank assets is inversely related
to institutional quality, as measured by the overall quality of regulation or the broader rule of
law indicator, and stringent disclosure requirements. Additionally, perceptions of institutional
quality, which are likely to be aﬀected by previous banking crises, also seem to be important
determinants of the share of state banks. While the theory showed that subsidies might maintain
state banks even in the presence of a good regulatory and supervisory environment, our empirical
ﬁndings suggest that the relative signiﬁcance of such political interference in the banking sector
is at best small, compared to the eﬀects of institutional under-development. Thus, improving the
institutions that foster the development of private banks appears to be the key to reducing the
role of state banks in the economy.
3.6 Additional robustness checks
Additional robustness checks are carried out using alternative measures of the dependent variable.
Speciﬁcally, we use four of the variables used by La Porta et al. (2002) to measure diﬀerent aspects
of government ownership in banking.39 To this end, we re-estimate our preferred speciﬁcation
15A, as well as speciﬁcation 16A (which, in addition to the regulatory, disclosure and banking
crisis variables of 15A, also includes the legal origin dummies).40 The La Porta et al. (2002)
variables that we utilize are as follows:41
(i) GB95: share of the assets of the top ten banks in a given country owned by the government
of that country in 1995.
(ii) GC20: share of the assets of the top ten banks in a given country controlled by the govern-
ment at the 20% level in 1995.
39We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this.
40In these regressions we use the 1996 values of regulatory quality from Kaufmann et al. (1999a); 1996 is the
earliest year for which this variable is available.
41All the variables below were multiplied by a factor of 100 to ensure comparability with SOB50.
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(iii) GC50: share of the assets of the top ten banks in a given country controlled by the govern-
ment at the 50% level in 1995.
(iv) GC90: share of the assets of the top ten banks in a given country controlled by the govern-
ment at the 90% level in 1995.42
Among these variables, GC50 is the closest deﬁnition to our chosen dependent variable, SOB50
(the share of total banking sector assets of banks in which the government holds a share of at least
50%) which closely reﬂects the considerations of our theoretical model. This is because the public
is likely to perceive a bank as state-owned if the government has a 50% share or higher. However,
GC50 is an imperfect proxy for our theoretical variable, with the degree of imperfection increasing
in the amount of banking assets held outside the top ten banks. GB95 is highly correlated with
GC50 with a correlation coeﬃcient of 97% and as such it is the second closest variable to our
chosen dependent variable. However, it is also focused on the top ten banks instead of the entire
banking system. Moreover, it also introduces another source of imperfection because it emphasizes
ownership of banking assets instead of ownership of banks. Consider for example the following
hypothetical scenario. In country A the government owns 10% of each of the top ten banks and in
country B the government completely owns one bank that its share of assets in the top ten is 10%.
In both countries GB95 is 10%, yet both banks’ and depositors’ behavior may be rather diﬀerent.
GC90 is conceptually a better proxy for our theoretical variable than GB95, even though 90%
ownership is probably too narrow a deﬁnition of government owned banks, since a 50% share is
probably suﬃcient for a bank to behave as state owned and be perceived as such by depositors.
Finally, GC20 is probably the weakest proxy for our theoretical variable, since it provides for too
wide a deﬁnition of government ownership. Even if the government is the largest shareholder with
a 20% stake in a bank, the bank may not behave as a state bank, especially if the links to the state
are indirect, through holding companies. Importantly, governments may be less inclined to allow
banks to fail where their share is 50%, compared to cases where it is 20%. Similarly, depositors
are much less likely to perceive a bank as government owned at 20% than at 50%, especially if
the links to the government are indirect.
The results of running the Tobit regressions with the La Porta et al. variables are presented
in Table 10. The λ- and γ-proxies remain signiﬁcant at the 5% level in all the speciﬁcations that
42For further details see Appendix in La Porta et al. (2002).
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correspond to Model 15A. Moreover, the coeﬃcients are remarkably similar to those reported in
Table 7. The coeﬃcients for regulatory quality range from –15.02 to –12.39, compared with –12.64
in Table 7 and are closest for GC50 and GB95, as expected. The coeﬃcients on the disclosure
variable range from –13.22 to –10.91, compared with –10.41 in Table 7. The banking crisis
dummy, which covers the period 1990-95, is however, statistically insigniﬁcant in all regressions.
Taken together with our earlier results, given that the La Porta variables relate to 1995 while our
preferred dependent variable was measured primarily in 1999, these ﬁndings suggest that banking
crises during 1990-95 led to increased government ownership of banks but only after a considerable
lag. This is not surprising given that the usual process of bank restructuring that follows banking
crises takes several years to complete.
The speciﬁcations that correspond to Model 16A show that among the legal origin dummies,
the one that is statistically signiﬁcant in most regressions is socialist legal origin. Speciﬁcally, this
dummy is signiﬁcant at the 10% level in the GB95 and GC50 regressions and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level in the GC20 regression. The coeﬃcients corresponding to the socialist origin dummy in these
regressions suggest that these economies had around 20% higher ownership than economies at the
same level of institutional development in the case of GB95 and GC50 and 30% higher ownership
in the case of GC20, which being the broadest deﬁnition of government ownership counts more
banks as state owned. Compared with the results that utilize our preferred dependent variable,
these results once again reﬂect the earlier timing of the La Porta variables, which coincides with
the middle phases of the transition process in the formerly socialist economies. Interestingly, in the
regression with GC90 variable—which utilizes the narrowest deﬁnition of government ownership—
the Anglo-Saxon legal origin dummy is negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level while the socialist
dummy is not signiﬁcant, suggesting that the degree of government ownership in the formerly
socialist countries had already declined by 1995. The signiﬁcance of the legal origin dummies in
these four speciﬁcations does not take away much from the explanatory power of the regulatory
quality variable, which remains signiﬁcant at conventional levels with very similar coeﬃcients.
However, some of the explanatory power of the disclosure variable is lost, as this variable now
appears with somewhat smaller coeﬃcients, in the range of –10.39 to –8.16, even though this
variable is still signiﬁcant at the 10% level in three of the four regressions. The results are clearly
weaker in the case of GC20 but this is the variable which has the weakest association to our
theoretical model.
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On balance, therefore, we conclude that these additional robustness checks, if anything, help
to bolster the empirical case of our paper. The institutional proxies remain statistically and
economically signiﬁcant, particularly in the case of the dependent variable that classiﬁes banks as
state owned when the government has a 50% share, which is most closely aligned with our theory.
The institutional proxies are not as strong in the case of the dependent variable that classiﬁes a
bank as state owned when the governments share of ownership is 20%. These ﬁndings suggest that
20% government ownership is not as good a substitute for weak institutions as 50% government
ownership. In other words, depositors are much less likely to be reassured by 20% government
ownership than by 50% government ownership. The insigniﬁcance of the banking crisis dummy
in these regressions, together with our earlier results, suggests that banking crises may take a
considerable amount of time before they result in a greater share of government ownership in
banking.
4 Concluding comments
Some aspects of our theoretical model resemble arguments found in the “developmental” view of
state banking (Gerschenkron 1962). According to this view, state banks could jump start both
ﬁnancial and economic development when economic institutions are inadequate for private banks
to play their developmental role. Our paper certainly formalizes some of these arguments and
provides evidence that is consistent with them. However, the paper should not be viewed simply as
a modern version of the developmental view of state banking for at least two important reasons.
Firstly, in our theoretical model we assume that state banks are inherently less eﬃcient than
private banks in terms of their lending and investment decisions, once private banking exceeds a
minimal threshold level of development; this is, of course, a key element of the political view of
state banking. Secondly, while our ﬁndings do imply that at very low levels of institutional quality
governments could create state banks to jump start ﬁnancial and economic development, our main
policy implication is that governments should build institutions that foster the development of
private banking. Speciﬁcally, our empirical results suggest that enhancing market regulation and
strengthening disclosure rules are particularly eﬀective means of reducing government ownership
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in banking.43 Our theoretical results suggest that these types of institutions are likely to increase
depositors’ conﬁdence in private banking institutions, by preventing or curbing any opportunistic
tendencies that are likely to be present in transitional or less developed banking systems.
Our paper also departs from the political view of state banks in at least two important respects,
even though we do assume that private banks are more eﬃcient than state banks. Firstly, it
acknowledges the possibility that there are circumstances under which depositors may prefer state
banks and in so doing it emphasizes the usefulness of state banks at low levels of institutional
development. Secondly, it predicts that privatization of state banks is at best unnecessary and at
worst detrimental. According to our model, state banks will die a natural death when they are no
longer useful, assuming any subsidies are removed. If they are less eﬃcient than private banks, as
suggested by the political view, then, unless they are subsidized, they would be unable to compete
with private banks once institutional quality is suﬃciently high to prevent opportunistic behavior.
At low levels of institutional development, on the other hand, privatization of state banks would
be detrimental since no private bank will choose to enter the market due to depositors’ mistrust
in new private banks. Thus, an important policy implication of our results is that instead of
privatizing state banks or, indeed, subsidizing them, governments should build institutions that
foster the development of private banks and should remove any subsidies from state banks. Our
ﬁndings are, therefore, consistent with the literature that emphasizes the ﬁrst-order importance
of institutions for economic growth (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, Kaufmann, Kraay
and Zoido-Lobaton 1999b, Berglof and Bolton 2002).
The conclusions of this paper may appear pessimistic. They suggest that there are no
easy alternatives to institutions-building if developing countries are to reap the beneﬁts of well-
functioning ﬁnancial systems. Institution-building is clearly a process that is frequently long-
43Good examples of a substantial improvement in regulatory quality (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005)
accompanied by a reduction in government ownership in banking are Iceland and Lithuania. In both countries
banking sector development was greatly enhanced in the process. In Iceland the share of government ownership
declined from 71.3% in 1995 (La Porta et al. 2002) to 0% by 2001 (Barth, Caprio and Levine 2003). The regulatory
quality index increased by 1.29, which represents an increase of 143%. The ratio of bank deposits to GDP increased
by 61% during 1996–2004 (Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine 2006). In Lithuania the share of government ownership
declined from 44% in 1998 (Barth et al. 2001) to 12.16% in 2001 (Barth et al. 2003). The regulatory quality index
increased by 0.78, representing an increase of 105%. Bank deposits to GDP increased by 79.5% during 1996–2004
(Beck et al. 2006).
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drawn-out, and could well stall due to political economy factors. To end on a more positive note,
however, it could be pointed out that the new literature on the political economy of ﬁnancial
development oﬀers a number of fruitful insights that may provide the basis for a better under-
standing of the mechanisms strengthening the necessary institutions (Rajan and Zingales 2003).
Thus, more research into the political economy of institutions for ﬁnancial development would
clearly be highly beneﬁcial.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
For each type of the equilibrium, derive the necessary conditions by specifying the equilibrium
behavior of an opportunistic bank, a marginal depositor, and an honest bank.
In HE, for a given level of demand for private banking, an opportunistic bank prefers to comply
with its deposit contracts:
r − ri ≥ (1 + r)(1− λ), (21)
the marginal depositor located at x¯i from bank i is indiﬀerent between the two nearest private
banks and prefers either of these two banks to the state bank:
1 + ri − α · x¯i = 1 + ri+1 − α ·
( 1
n
− x¯i
)
, (22)
1 + ri − α · x¯i ≥ 1 + rs, (23)
and any private bank sets its deposit rate at a level that maximizes its proﬁts,
∂V/∂ri = 0 where V = (r− ri)Di for any i = 1, . . . , n. (24)
From (22), x¯i = 1/(2n) + (ri − ri+1)/(2α), and therefore:
Di = x¯i + x¯i−1 =
1
n
+
2ri − ri+1 − ri−1
2α
. (25)
Substituting this into (24) and using symmetry, the proﬁt-maximizing rate of any private bank is
equal to:
ri = r − α
n
(i = 1, . . . , n). (26)
Under the free-entry condition, the proﬁts are competed away, and therefore the equilibrium
number of banks that enter is found as:
n =
√
α/F. (27)
Substituting (26) and (27) back into (21) and (23), the necessary conditions of HE are formulated
as:
λ ≥ 1−
√
αF
1 + r
≡ λ¯ (28)
rs ≤ r− 32
√
αF. (29)
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In IE, every opportunistic bank prefers to breach all its deposit contracts:
r − ri < (1 + r)(1− λ). (30)
Given that all opportunistic banks cheat, the marginal depositor located at x˜i is indiﬀerent be-
tween the nearest private bank i and the state bank:
1 + rs = (1− γ)(1 + ri) + γλ(1+ r)− αx˜i. (31)
And an honest bank solves its proﬁt-maximization problem, given that all opportunistic banks
breach (q = 0). The latter adversely aﬀects the level of demand faced by every private bank:
Di = 2x˜i =
2
α
· [(1− γ)ri− γ(1− λ(1 + r))− rs], (32)
which is derived from (31). The proﬁt-maximization problem of an honest bank is solved by
setting:
ri =
r(1− γ) + rs + γ(1− λ(1 + r))
2(1− γ) . (33)
(Note that an opportunistic bank optimally mimics the honest bank’s oﬀer of the deposit rate,
since otherwise the depositors could tell the two types of banks apart and would avoid contracting
with the opportunists.) Substituting (33) into (30) and re-arranging, we obtain:
λ < 1− r − rs
(2− γ)(1 + r) ≡ λ˜1. (34)
The ex post proﬁt of an honest bank is positive when the proﬁt-maximizing level of the deposit
rate ri in (33) is smaller than r (and therefore x˜i > 0). This is equivalent to the following
additional constraint:
λ > 1− r − rs
γ(1 + r)
≡ λ˜2. (35)
It is straightforward to check that λ˜1 ∈ (0, 1) and λ˜1 > λ˜2 for any γ ∈ (0, 1), λ˜2 ∈ [0, 1) if
γ ∈ [(r− rs)/(1+ r), 1), and λ¯ > λ˜1 if γ > (2
√
αF − (r− rs))/
√
αF . The assumption of free-entry
together with the necessary condition of 0 < Di < 1/n gives an upper bound on the number of
private banks that would enter the industry in this equilibrium as follows:
(r− ri) · 2x˜i = F (35)⇔ x˜i = F2(r − ri) <
1
2n
⇔ 0 < n < r − ri
F
≡ n˜,
where ri is given by (33).
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Finally, LE is characterized by the same constraints as IE, except that now honest banks ﬁnd
it unproﬁtable to enter: the level of ri which satisﬁes FOC of their proﬁt maximization problem
results in non-positive ex post proﬁts, i.e., r − ri ≤ 0 which from the above analysis arises when
(35) is invalidated. Non-positive proﬁts imply that honest banks do not enter, and therefore the
depositors expect to face a breaching opportunistic private bank with certainty when
λ ≤ λ˜2. (36)
The certainty of breach of a private deposit contract implies that no depositor is willing to bank
in the private sector. Hence the equilibrium demand is Di = 0 for any n > 0 and i = 1, . . . , n
when (36) holds. The equilibrium zero level of demand for private deposit contracts ensures that
no private bank enters. 
Proof of Remark 3
To establish the claim, we need to ﬁnd the range of δ-values for which λ˜e1 ≥ 1, and therefore
constraint (10) is validated for any γ ∈ (0, 1):
λ˜e1 =
1
1− δ ·
(
1− r − rs
γ(1 + r)
)
≥ 1 ⇔ γ ≤ 2δ(1 + r)− (r− rs)
δ(1 + r)
. (37)
The latter is true for any γ ∈ (0, 1) if
2δ(1 + r)− (r − rs)
δ(1 + r)
≥ 1 ⇔ δ ≥ r − rs
1 + r
≡ δˆ. (38)

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Appendix B
Table 3: Description of Variables and Data Sources
Variable Variable name Definition Date Source
gi SOB50 Share of total banking sector assets
of banks in which the government
holds a share of at least 50%
1999 Barth et al. (2001)
λ1 Regulatory quality Measure of whether regulation is ef-
fective in promoting private markets
1997/1998 Kaufmann et al. (1999a)
λ2 Rule of law Reflects the degree to which
the citizens of a country are
willing to accept the established
institutions to adjudicate disputes
1997 Knack and Keefer, ICRG
γ1 Disclosure index Disclosure rules: consolidated
balance sheets, statement of non-
performing loans, risk management
procedures and top 5 banks rated
by international agencies (yes = 1,
no = 0, missing entry = 0). Index
created by adding up dummies
1999 Barth et al. (2001)
γ2 Foreign ownership Share of total banking sector
assets of banks in which foreign
banks hold a share of at least 50%
1999 Barth et al. (2001)
q Banking crisis dummy Perception of the quality of
institutions: Banking crisis
dummy = 1 if there was a
banking crisis in the 1990s
1990s Caprio and
Klingebiel (2002)
S1 Govnt consumption Government final consumption
expenditure as per cent of GDP
1997 World Develop-
ment Indicators
S2 Left dummy Political orientation of government:
left-of-centre = 1, otherwise 0
1997 Beck et al. (2001)
S3 IMF loans Loans agreed with the IMF
over 1990–1998 period as
a percentage of 1998 GDP
1997 IMF MONA database
(unpublished, avail-
able upon request)
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Table 4: List of Countries and Key Variables
Country SOB50 Regulatory Rule of law Disclosure Foreign Banking
quality index ownership crisis
Argentina 30.0 0.67 5 2 49.0 1
Australia 0.0 0.96 6 3 17.1 0
Austria 4.1 0.90 6 2 5.1 0
Bahrain 3.7 0.75 5 3 28.0 0
Bangladesh 69.9 –0.16 3 1 6.4 1
Belarus 67.3 –1.47 . 1 2.8 1
Bolivia 0.0 0.88 3 2 42.3 1
Botswana 2.4 0.57 4 2 97.6 0
Brazil 51.5 0.13 3 2 16.7 1
Burundi 63.0 –0.85 . 3 0.0 1
Cambodia 16.0 –0.04 . 1 71.0 0
Canada 0.0 0.87 6 3 . 0
Chile 11.7 0.90 5 2 32.0 0
Croatia 37.0 0.24 . 2 6.7 1
Cyprus 3.3 0.84 5 3 10.9 0
Czech Republic 19.0 0.57 6 1 26.0 1
Denmark 0.0 1.05 6 2 . 0
Egypt 66.6 0.12 4 2 4.2 1
Estonia 0.0 0.74 . 2 85.0 1
Finland 21.9 1.14 6 3 7.8 1
France 0.0 0.71 5 1 . 1
Gambia 0.0 –0.25 5 2 76.4 0
Germany 42.0 0.89 6 1 4.2 0
Ghana 37.9 0.28 3 1 54.3 0
Greece 13.0 0.61 5.3 1 5.0 0
Guatemala 7.6 0.44 3 1 4.9 0
Guyana 19.0 0.23 4 2 16.0 0
Honduras 1.1 0.08 3 1 1.6 0
Hungary 3.0 0.85 6 2 62.0 1
Iceland 64.0 0.61 6 2 0.0 0
India 80.0 –0.04 4 1 0.0 1
Indonesia 44.0 0.12 4 2 7.0 1
Italy 17.0 0.59 6 2 5.0 0
Jamaica 56.0 0.76 3 2 44.0 1
Japan 1.2 0.39 6 2 5.9 1
Jordan 0.0 0.42 4 2 68.0 0
Korea 29.7 0.22 4 3 0.0 1
Kuwait 0.0 –0.09 6 3 0.0 0
Lebanon 0.0 0.10 4 3 27.2 0
Lesotho 51.0 -0.06 . 2 49.0 0
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Country SOB50 Regulatory Rule of law Disclosure Foreign Banking
quality index ownership crisis
Lithuania 44.0 0.09 . 2 48.0 1
Luxembourg 5.0 0.95 6 2 95.0 0
Macedonia 0.5 –0.31 . 2 92.7 1
Malawi 48.9 0.08 4 2 8.3 0
Malaysia 0.0 0.48 5 2 18.0 1
Malta 0.0 0.39 6 3 48.8 0
Mauritius 0.0 0.22 . 2 25.8 0
Mexico 25.0 0.61 3 2 19.9 1
Moldova 7.1 –0.28 . 2 33.4 0
Morocco 23.9 0.22 6 2 18.8 0
Nepal 20.0 –0.36 . 1 35.0 0
Netherlands 5.9 1.14 6 3 . 0
New Zealand 0.0 1.21 6 3 99.0 0
Nigeria 13.0 –0.35 3 2 0.0 1
Oman 0.0 0.31 5 2 11.1 0
Panama 11.6 1.00 3 2 38.3 0
Peru 2.5 0.67 3 2 40.4 0
Philippines 12.1 0.57 4 3 12.8 1
Poland 43.7 0.57 5 2 26.4 1
Portugal 20.8 0.89 5.3 2 11.7 0
Puerto Rico 0.0 0.85 . 2 30.8 0
Qatar 43.4 0.33 6 2 14.9 0
Romania 70.0 0.20 5 1 8.0 1
Russia 68.0 –0.30 4 2 9.0 1
Rwanda 50.0 –1.17 . 1 50.0 1
Salvador, El 7.0 1.23 . 2 12.5 1
Saudi Arabia 0.0 –0.15 5 3 0.0 0
Singapore 0.0 1.25 6 3 50.0 0
Slovenia 39.6 0.53 . 2 4.6 1
South Africa 0.0 0.24 3.7 3 5.2 0
Spain 0.0 0.86 5.9 2 11.0 0
Sri Lanka 55.0 0.62 4 3 . 1
Sweden 0.0 0.85 6 1 1.8 1
Switzerland 15.0 0.88 6 3 8.5 0
Taiwan 43.0 0.83 4 2 . 0
Tajikistan 7.4 –1.52 . 2 6.2 0
Thailand 30.7 0.19 5 1 7.2 1
Trinidad & Tobago 15.0 0.72 4 2 7.9 0
Turkey 35.0 0.60 4 1 66.3 0
United Kingdom 0.0 1.21 6 3 . 0
United States 0.0 1.14 6 2 4.7 0
Venezuela 4.9 0.09 4 2 33.7 1
Zambia 23.0 0.25 4 2 64.0 1
45
Table 5: Summary Statistics
Variable name Variable Observations Mean Std. deviation Minimum Maximum
Government ownership gi 108 20.60 24.87 0.0 97.10
Regulatory quality λ1 93 0.28 0.68 –1.93 1.25
Rule of law λ2 71 4.73 1.12 2.70 6.0
Disclosure index γ1 98 2.00 0.63 1.0 3.0
Foreign ownership γ2 91 33.13 32.60 0.0 100.0
Banking crisis dummy q 106 0.40 0.49 0.0 1.0
Table 6: Correlations
SOB50 Banking Regulatory Rule Disclosure Foreign Government Left IMF
Crisis Dummy Quality of Law Index Ownership Consumption Dummy Loans
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 1.0000
2 0.3767 1.0000
3 –0.4217 –0.2370 1.0000
4 –0.3152 –0.2427 0.5984 1.0000
5 –0.3478 –0.2327 0.3284 0.2639 1.0000
6 –0.2811 –0.1562 0.1849 –0.0585 –0.0383 1.0000
7 0.0113 0.0627 0.3979 0.5042 –0.0787 0.0155 1.0000
8 0.1152 –0.0137 0.0181 0.1170 0.0600 –0.1335 0.1225 1.0000
9 –0.0306 0.2603 –0.2030 –0.3013 –0.0238 0.2802 –0.2182 0.0027 1.0000
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Table 7: Government Ownership of Banks and Institutions
Dependent variable: SOB50
Regression 13A 14A 13B 14B 13C 14C 13D 14D
Variables
λ
Regul. quality –16.16*** –16.45*** –13.33*** –12.40**
(5.52) (5.87) (5.27) (5.64)
Low reg.qual. spline –12.53** –13.03**
(6.36) (6.60)
High reg.qual. spline –52.77 –53.43
(33.65) (34.72)
Rule of law –7.02* –10.60***
(3.18) (3.33)
γ
Disclosure index –11.87** –11.43** –10.78** –10.41** –14.47*** –11.02** –15.00*** –14.27***
(4.84) (4.88) (4.90) (4.92) (5.35) (5.22) (4.75) (4.74)
Foreign ownership –0.27** –0.30**
(0.11) (0.12)
Legal origin
Anglo-Saxon 2.98 –1.83 –0.56 –11.68
(8.60) (8.65) (8.57) (9.00)
German 15.30 14.56 21.2* 1.56
(13.18) (11.45) (11.56) (12.00)
Scandinavian 8.52 11.64 18.36 7.8
(14.75) (14.90) (14.93) (15.33)
Socialist 6.93 7.19 31.87*** 6.74
(8.64) (8.58) (12.57) (7.97)
Constant 46.19*** 43.21*** 44.47*** 41.42*** 77.11** 81.61*** 58.61*** 57.78***
(9.72) (10.05) (9.79) (10.11) (16.77) (16.33) (9.99) (10.49)
N of observations 83 83 83 83 67 67 76 76
Log Likelihood –300.00 –298.53 –299.37 –297.94 –236.55 –232.02 –277.62 –275.83
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 8: Government Ownership of Banks, Institutions and Banking Crises
Dependent variable: SOB50
Regression 15A 16A 15B 16B 15C 16C 15D 16D
Variables
λ
Regulatory quality –12.64** –14.23*** –10.55** –10.86**
(5.20) (5.49) (4.92) (5.26)
Low reg.qual. spline –9.57 –11.91*
(5.94) (6.14)
High reg.qual. spline –44.99 –44.25
(31.70) (33.13)
Rule of law –5.02* –8.15**
(3.04) (3.46)
γ
Disclosure index –10.41*** –10.15** –9.47** –9.36** –12.55** –10.66** –13.71*** –13.42***
(4.51) (4.55) (4.57) (4.60) (5.05) (5.08) (4.42) (4.43)
Foreign Ownership –0.24** –0.27**
(0.10) (0.11)
q
Banking crisis dummy 19.84*** 20.84*** 19.62*** 20.47*** 18.97*** 14.06* 18.77*** 19.51***
(5.76) (6.10) (5.74) (6.09) (6.79) (7.44) (5.82) (5.82)
Legal origin
Anglo-Saxon –5.88 –5.1 –3.16 –14.00
(8.17) (8.23) (8.52) (8.55)
German 13.88 13.34 18.52 –0.21
(10.68) (10.63) (11.29) (11.1)
Scandinavian 3.7 6.27 11.78 1.42
(13.75) (13.99) (14.93) (14.25)
Socialist –2.92 –2.59 20.28 –2.81
(8.48) (8.45) (13.58) (7.87)
Constant 33.55*** 33.39*** 32.2*** 32.16*** 56.36*** 65.85*** 46.12*** 48.72***
(9.67) (9.74) (9.72) (9.78) (17.20) (17.78) (9.84) (10.10)
N of observations 83 83 83 83 67 67 76 76
Log Likelihood –294.39 –292.98 –293.84 –292.55 –232.83 –230.27 –272.05 –270.60
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 9: Government Ownership of Banks and Government Propensity to Subsidies
Dependent variable: SOB50
Regression 17D-1 18D-1 17D-2 18D-2 17D-3 18D-3
Variables
λ
Regulatory quality –9.16* –9.87* –10.52** –10.84** –9.71* –10.51*
(5.22) (5.62) (4.93) (5.26) (5.05) (5.36)
γ
Disclosure index –14.72*** –14.07*** –13.67*** –13.39*** –13.73*** –13.39***
(4.87) (4.96) (4.42) (4.44) (4.42) (4.42)
Foreign Ownership –0.18* –0.23* –0.28** –0.28** –0.25** –0.28**
(0.11) (0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11)
q
Banking crisis dummy 17.92*** 19.97*** 18.73*** 19.58*** 19.30*** 20.43***
(3.86) (6.65) (5.46) (5.84) (5.48) (5.90)
S
Government consumption –0.11 –0.13
(0.54) (0.61)
Left dummy 1.00 0.97
(5.77) (5.92)
IMF loans 0.30 0.21
(0.39) (0.35)
Legal origin
Anglo-Saxon –15.79* –14.26* –13.95
(5.62) (8.70) (8.65)
German –1.02 –0.23 –0.21
(12.53) (11.1) (11.08)
Scandinavian 2.5 0.94 1.43
(15.61) (14.56) (14.23)
Socialist –6.03 –3.06 –3.71
(9.41) (8.02) (7.96)
Constant 47.73*** 50.67*** 45.76*** 48.46*** 44.88*** 47.79***
(11.97) (12.29) (10.05) (10.23) (9.84) (10.13)
N of observations 64 64 76 76 75 75
Log Likelihood –224.91 –223.17 –272.04 –270.51 –267.07 –265.56
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 10: Additional Robustness Checks
Dependent variable is taken from La Porta et al. (2002)
Dependent variable GB95 GC50 GC90 GC20
Model Model Model Model
15A 16A 15A 16A 15A 16A 15A 16A
Explanatory variable
Regulatory quality –12.64** –11.80** –12.39** –12.68* –15.02*** –17.59*** –14.78** –12.17*
(5.15) (5.55) (6.05) (6.49) (5.45) (6.18) (6.00) (6.29)
Disclosure index –12.12** –9.08* –13.22** –10.39* –10.91** –8.98* –12.41** –8.16
(4.96) (4.83) (5.82) (5.64) (5.18) (5.18) (5.79) (5.49)
Banking crisis dummy 1.16 4.28 0.92 3.84 5.31 2.19 1.36 8.38
(7.50) (8.22) (8.81) (9.61) (7.77) (8.72) (8.75) (9.34)
Legal origin
Anglo-Saxon –8.10 –6.10 –15.82* –6.80
(7.71) (9.02) (8.46) (8.74)
German 13.41 23.06* 2.08 20.71
(11.63) (13.59) (12.59) (13.19)
Scandinavian 9.36 13.85 18.48 5.33
(14.77) (17.24) (15.56) (16.78)
Socialist 19.93* 21.49* 6.12 30.60***
(10.56) (12.38) (11.22) (12.00)
Constant 63.33*** 53.17*** 65.32*** 54.46*** 49.27*** 50.59*** 71.37*** 53.77***
(11.55) (12.91) (13.56) (15.09) (12.06) (13.98) (13.48) (14.65)
N of observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
Log Likelihood –268.57 –264.21 –269.64 –265.47 –245.20 –241.35 –277.41 –271.74
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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